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Abstract:   It has long been accepted within the information technology (IT) research
community that IT should have a profound impact on industrial organization.  However,
there has been as yet on the changes to be expected in the design of firms or industries;
rather, there is an apparently inconsistent collection of conjectures and analyses.  We are
now able to offer an integrative framework for describing the impacts of IT on an industrial
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states that the impact of IT on the organization of economic activity is to lead to a greater
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It has long been accepted within the information
technology (IT) research community that IT should have a
profound impact on industrial organization. However,
there has been as yet no consensus on the changes to be
expected in the design of firms or industries: rather, there
is an apparently inconsistent collection of conjectures and
analyses.
We are now able to offer an integrative framework for
describing the impacts of IT on industrial organization.
Our analyses generally support the “move to the middle”
hypothesis that states that the impact of IT on the
organization of economic activity is to lead to a greater
degree of outsourcing where this increased outsourcing is
done from fewer suppliers with whom the buyer has long
term relationships.
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There is growing evidence that large manufacturing
companies in the U.S. and elsewhere are downsizing. The
pressure to downsize has been attributed to a variety of
reasons including the increasing intensity of competition
and an increased emphasis on cost-cutting. Coupled with
this increased trend to smaller organizational size, where
the firm procures more of its requirements from outside
suppliers instead of satisfying these requirements in-
house, there is a noticeable emphasis on using fewer long-
term partnerships with suppliers and customers to
conduct business. This is a shift away from shopping
among a large number of suppliers based purely on price.
The reasons that are normally suggested to explain this
trend of using fewer suppliers, and long-term
relationships, include suggestions that firms are placing
an increased emphasis on product quality and hence by
using fewer suppliers, the suppliers will have an incentive
to invest in improving the quality of the products they
supply and share in the surplus they help create.
Though many of the reasons commonly put forth to
explain this trend of more outsourcing and an increased
reliance on fewer and longer-term suppliers are probably
true, they fail to provide a complete picture. Many of
these reasons were probably as important in the previous
years as they are today. Further, though some of these
factors are more important in some industries and some
countries than in others, the trend towards more
outsourcing to fewer longer-term suppliers seems to be
present in many different industries and in many different
countries. This suggests that a factor that is critical to the
whole issue of the economics of organization, and one
that has undergone revolutionary transformations in recent
years, must be responsible for the changes occurring in
many organizations. We believe that the factor responsible
for facilitating these dramatic organizational changes is
information technology (IT).
Researchers in the IT community have recognized that
IT, and the changes occurring in the price/performance
characteristics of IT, plays an important role in the
organization of economic activity. Numerous authors have
examined the ways that information technology affects
search costs (e.g., Bakos U]: Malone, Benjamin and
Yates [13]), coordination costs (e.g., Malone, Benjamin,
and Yates [13]; Malone and Rockart [14]: Gurbaxani and
Whang [10]), transaction risks (e.g., Clemons and Row
[9]; Clemons, Reddi, and Row [8]), and the incentives of
buyers and suppliers (e.g., Clemons and Kleindorfer [5],
Bakos and Brynjolfsson [2]). All have attempted to infer
the strategic implications for firms. Sometimes the
findings have been mutually supportive — both Clemons,
Reddi, and ROW ([8]) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson ([2])
observe that it is reasonable to expect a reduction in the
number of suppliers even when outsourcing is increasing;
that is, a move towards virtual vertical integration, away
from use of pure markets. Sometimes however, findings
appear to be in direct conflict — Clemons, Reddi, and
Row ([8]) predict a move away from pure markets, while
Malone, Benjamin, Yates and Rockart ([13], [14]) predict
more extensive use of markets.Malone et al. ([13]) suggest that the net effect of IT’s
impact is that firms will increasingly rely on the “market”
over the “hierarchy”. That is, firms will outsource more
where they satisfy their requirements by shopping around
for the best price in the market instead of satisfying their
requirements in-house. Clemons et al. ([8]) suggest that
between the two polar options of the market and the
hierarchy there are modes of organization that involve
outside suppliers in long-term cooperative relationships
with the buyer. These modes of organization are neither
pure markets nor pure hierarchies. Clemons et al. suggest
that these long-term cooperative modes will increasingly
become the dominant choice of method of organizing
economic activity. The contribution of this paper is to
analytically demonstrate the conditions under which a firm
would increasingly prefer the market option when
procuring from outside suppliers and the conditions under
which the firm would increasingly prefer “partnerships” or
cooperative long-term relationships when procuring from
outside.
We are now able to offer an integrative framework for
describing the impacts of IT on industrial organization:
Ž Under conditions of high product complexity,
where vertical integration had been preferred, we find that
the advantages of vertical integration are reduced.
Ž Under conditions of lower product complexity,
where outsourcing had been preferred, we find a change in
the nature of outsourcing.
Ž Under conditions of lower product complexity
and when the supplier behaves opportunistically, a
reduction in the unit cost of IT leads to increased long
term contracting and partnership arrangements; that is, a
move away from the spot market.
Ž Under conditions of lower product complexity
and when the supplier behaves opportunistically, a
reduction in the relationship-specificity of investments in
IT leads to increased long term contracting and partnership
arrangement; that is, again a move away from the spot
market.
Our analyses generally support the “move to the
middle” hypothesis that states that the imptact of IT on
the organization of economic activity is to lead to a
greater degree of outsourcing where this increased
outsourcing is done from fewer suppliers with whom the
buyer has long term relationships.
In Section 2 we discuss some of the earlier work on
IT’s impact on the organization of economic activity. In
Section 3 we develop a model which incorporates the
factors suggested as being important by Malone et al. and
Clemons et al. and others, and identify the precise impact
of IT. The analysis of the model is done in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the implications of our analysis and
also contains directions for future research.
2.0 Literature review
Transaction cost economics considers the cost of
dealing with outside suppliers as an important factor in
deciding whether to manufacture a required part in-house or
obtain the part from outside suppliers. The transaction
cost includes the cost of searching for an appropriate
supplier, contracting with the supplier for the part,
coordinating with the supplier for the delivery of the part,
monitoring the performance of the supplier, and the related
risks associated with depending on someone else for one’s
requirements. Williamson ([15]) uses transactions costs to
explain why firms choose a particular method of
organization. Transaction cost economics provides an
explanation for why large vertically integrated
organizations, such as those documented by Chandler
([3]), flourished in the U.S. in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century.
A primary focus of economic research has been the risk
arising from investments that are specific to the
relationship with another firm, say a supplier or a
customer. Once such a relationship-specific investment is
made for example by the buyer with a supplier, the
supplier may attempt to re-negotiate its contract or
otherwise behave opportunistically to exploit the buyer
whose investment is “sunk”. This risk from relationship-
specific investments has been investigated by Williamson
([15]), Klein et al. ([11]), and others.
Since transactions costs are composed of various
information-based activities such as search (searching for
an appropriate supplier), monitoring (evaluating the
performance of the selected supplier and comparing it to
that of other available suppliers), and coordination
(exchanging information with the supplier including order
placement and obtaining order status), it is normal to
expect that IT would have an influence on the size of
transactions costs.
Database technology and the ability to access remotely
located information resources has greatly increased the
ability of firms to search for appropriate suppliers and
services at a significantly lower cost. Scanner technologyand barcoding are examples of technologies that permit
firms to improve their monitoring capability. For
example, these technologies allow manufacturers of
consumer goods track the flow of their products through
the distribution channels, thereby allowing them to
evaluate the performance of agents in the channel and
design effective incentives tO improve pricing and
distribution.
Ciborra ([4]) recognized that IT reduces transctions
costs, thereby improving both internal production as well
as outside procurement. The work does not suggest
whether IT will affect one mode of economic organization
more than the other.
Gurbaxani and Whang ([10]) combine transaction cost
arguments with agency theory arguments to suggest that
IT’s ability to reduce both transaction costs  and agency
costs will affect the size of the firm in opposite ways.
IT’s ability to reduce transaction costs suggests that IT
will lead to smaller firms (more outsourcing perhaps)
whereas IT’s ability to reduce agency costs would lead to
larger firms. Their work does not attempt to predict the
net effect of IT on firm size, that is whether we should
witness an increased degree of outsourcing. Further, they
do not address the issue of how IT may affect inter-firm
relationships.
Bakos and Brynjolfsson ([2]) demonstrate analytically
that if IT increases the importance of the intangible
aspects of quality, then IT is responsible for causing firms
to reduce the size of their supplier base. Their arguments
are based on providing incentives to the suppliers to
invest in quality improvement; the smaller the number of
suppliers that the firm works with, the greater the
incentive to each supplier to invest in the relationship.
Malone, Benjamin, and Yates ([13]) argued that
transactions costs are greater when using the market
(outside procurement) than when satisfying the firm’s
requirements through internal production. This is because
when producing in-house, the firm typically does not need
to search for a supplier, or monitor its own manufacturing
unit very closely for under-performance, or worry that the
internal manufacturing unit will exploit its dependence on
it.  Since IT reduces transactions cost, whether external or
internal, and since the external transactions cost is
significantly greater than the internal transactions cost, it
is reasonable to assume that IT will benefit external
procurement more than internal production. Malone et al.
suggest that the net effect of IT’s ability to reduce
transactions cost is to favor market procurement over
interred production in more cases than before.
Clemons, Reddi and Row ([8]) agree with the basic
argument that a reduction in the transactions cost due to
IT will cause firms to outsource more. However to
understand the manner in which this increased outsourcing
will be done, it is necessary to distinguish between the
different methods by which outside procurement may be
done. They consider the two polar modes of external
procurement; the third mode of interest is in-house
manufacture, or the vertical integration mode:
Ž  market suppliers:  Procure from outside
using a number of short-term suppliers where the buyer
shops for the best price each time it requires a part.
Ž partnership:  Procure from outside by
selecting a small number of suppliers from the pool of
available suppliers and building long-term cooperative
relations with these few suppliers.
Ž vertical integration:  Manufacture the
required part in-house.
If the three-way distinction in the organization of
economic activity is made, the Malone et al. ([13])
argument points to a “move to the market”, that is the
increased outsourcing due to IT will be done by using
market suppliers. Clemons et al. ([8]) argue that since IT
investments are still idiosyncratic and their benefits
involve a learning curve, long-term cooperative
arrangements will be preferred to short-term market
supplier arrangements so that firms can fully benefit from
their IT investments. They suggest that IT will cause a
“move to the middle”, that is the increased outsourcing
due to IT will be conducted using partnerships rather than
market suppliers.
3.0 The model
This paper proposes a model that builds upon the
earlier work by Malone et al. ([13]) and Clemons et al.
([8]). The model identifies the conditions under which the
“move to the market” hypothesis is true and the
conditions under which the “move to the middle”
hypothesis is true. The analysis in this paper summarizes
the interaction between important factors. Using earlier
classifications of costs and risks of inter-firm cooperation
(Clemons, Reddi and Row [8]), we construct a
mathematical model of these costs and risks, as functions
of product complexity, product price variability, and
contract duration, and of unit costs of IT and the
relationship-specificity of IT investments. The detailedsupporting analysis can be found in Clemons and Reddi
([7]).
We will consider a situation where there are a large
number of suppliers who can provide a certain part. Since
the number of suppliers is large, the buyer is not exposed
to any risk from small numbers bargaining—that is, there
are enough alternative sources of supply that the buyer is
not totally dependent on any one supplier. The buyer
requires this part to assemble a product that is finally sold
in the open market. The part is not “core” to the buyer’s
operations and the buyer must decide whether to produce
this part in-house or obtain the part from outside
suppliers. The buyer requires the part for M periods.
To produce the part in-house the buyer must make a
fixed cost investment K at the beginning of the first
period when the part is required. After the investment is
made, the buyer can produce the part at an average price cf
in each period.
If the buyer decides to obtain the part from outside, it
must use one of the N available suppliers. The available
suppliers can be ranked in order of the mean price at which
they can provide the required part. Let the N suppliers
actual price at which supplier i can provide the part in any
given period is a random variable Xi  with mean ci  and
Thee decision problem of interest is to decide among the
following three alternatives
(1) in-house manufacture
(2) market suppliers: procure from the lowest
price supplier in each period
(3) partnership: select the lowest average price
supplier and procure from that supplier for all the M
periods
Whichever alternative the buyer chooses, it must make
an investment in IT to coordinate with the unit supplying
the part, whether the unit is in-house or external to the
buyer.
We would like to understand the conditions under
which the buyer chooses each of the three methods of
organizing economic activity. Further, we would like to
examine how the changing characteristics of IT
investments may affect the firm’s choice of appropriate
economic organization.
3.1 Important factors
Some notation is necessary at this point. The two
characteristics of IT that are important to the analysis are
described below:
investments. As discussed earlier, the risk from making
relationship-specific investments is an important economic
in understanding economic organization. Borrowing from
Kleindorfer and Knieps ([12]), if a firm makes an
investment “I” to do business with its supplier, and the
buyer decides not to do any business with that supplier,
the “amount” of IT that can be purchased for one dollar.
changes over the last decade. The cost of hardware has seen
a decrease that is of many orders of magnitude. Also, the
degree to which IT investments are specific has reduced
greatly. Many computing platforms are gradually moving
to common standards. Software is now available to
facilitate running systems developed on one platform on
other platforms. There is pressure from the marketplace on
software firms to adopt open systems standards and write
applications that are compatible with those of other firms.
The primary thrust of our analysis is to understand how
relative advantages of using in-house production, market
suppliers, and partnerships.
Other factors important to our analysis are listed
below:
procured or produced. Attributes of interest include the
complexity of the product and uncertainty of
the demand for the product.
I: Size of the investment in IT.
M: Number of periods for which the buyer needs
a certain product.
p: Price at which the final product is sold in the
q: Quality of the product being contracted for.
market.D: Demand for the final product, where D(p, q).
d: Discount rate.
the fraction of the relationship-specific investment
made by the buyer that can be appropriated by the
investment is relationship-specific, the opportunism risk
case and the partnership case.
3.2 Decomposition of transactions cost
Clemons, Reddi and Row ([8]) decompose transactions
cost into three components: coordination cost, operations
risk, and opportunism risk. We shall adopt that
classification here. The three terms are briefly explained
below:
Coordination cost is the cost of coordinating
for the delivery of a product. It includes both the direct
cost of exchanging information such as production
schedules and product designs as well as the indirect costs
such as inventories. IT clearly can reduce the coordination
cost.
attributes such as complexity and demand uncertainty. C
use for coordination. C is also a decreasing function of the
duration for which the systems have been in use. There is
a learning curve associated with the use of systems and
this is captured by the relationship between C and t.
Operations risk is the risk that the supplier
under-performs; the under-performance could be intentional
to exploit the buyer without being detected by providing a
lower quality product, or the under-performance could be
due to factors beyond the supplier’s control such as poor
weather. In the first case where the under-performance is
intentional, operations risk arises because the complexity
of the contract terms makes it difficult to detect the under-
performance. IT may be able to reduce operations risk in
such situations by improving the buyer’s ability to
monitor the supplier. In the second case where the under-
performance is not intentional, IT may have no effect on
operations risk.
P is similar in behavior to the coordination cost
function C except that a portion of the operations risk is
not affected by the use of IT.
Opportunism risk  can arise from two
sources. One, if the buyer must make an investment with
the supplier and this investment is relationship-specific
then the buyer is exposed to the risk that after the
investment is made, the supplier reneges on the agreement
and attempts to re-negotiate the contract or act in other
ways detrimental to the interests of the buyer. This
investment could be in IT either to coordinate with the
supplier or it could be other capital investments such as m
production equipment. The second type of opportunism
risk is due to small numbers bargaining, where doing
business with a supplier creates a situation where the firm
has few alternative sources of supply. IT may have little
effect in preventing a small numbers bargaining situation.
We do not explicitly consider small numbers bargaining
here. But making a relationship-specific investment to
coordinate with one supplier may lead to a small numbers
bargaining situation. If firms make an investment in IT to
coordinate with the supplier, then the changing
characteristics of the relationship-specificity of the IT
investment will play a role in determining the
opportunism risk to which the firm is exposed.
3.3 Modes of economic organization
Here we derive the profit functions for each of the three
modes of economic organization.
Vertical Integration (In-house):  If the firm
decides to manufacture the required part in-house it does
not suffer from opportunism risk. That is, its own
manufacturing unit will presumably not attempt to
exploit it after the investment to manufacture in-house is
made. Similarly, we assume that the firm’s own unit will
not attempt to under-perform to maximize its own profit,
that is we assume that the operations risk in the vertical
integration ease is zero. The profit function for the vertical
integration case is given by:
-I -K (1)
Market Suppliers: If the firm decides to procure
from the spot market, it essentially shops around for thelowest price in each of the M periods. It will obtain the
part at an average price cmin = E[min(Xi), i= 1, N]. Given
that in each period the firm must make an investment in
IT, say I, to coordinate with the selected supplier, it faces
investment if it decides to procure from a different
supplier.
The profit function if the firm decides to procure from
the spot market suppliers is given by:
(2)
Partnership: If the firm decides to use a partnership
when procuring from an outside supplier, it selects the
lowest average cost supplier who can provide the part at
average price c1 and procures from that supplier for all the
M periods that it requires the part.
The profit function in the partnership case is given by
the supplier in a multi-period contract. Since there is no
accepted mathematical model of supplier opportunism in
muiti-period contracts of fixed duration, we assume that it
is bounded by that of a well-behaved partner who observes
the terms of the contract until the final period, at which
point he behaves like a short term contractor (that is,
greedy supplier who reprices immediately in an attempt to
the size of the effect predicted but, in some cases its
direction.
demand and production schedule information with its
supplier. The supplier can incorporate this information
into its own production schedules to cut down its own
production costs and thereby be positioned to offer the
product to the buyer at a lower cost. The degree to which
the supplier can benefit from this exchange of information
depends on the amount of information exchanged between
the buyer and the supplier, as well as the duration for
which the relationship has existed. Here again, as in the
cases of coordination cost and operations risk, the learning
curve effect of IT use plays an important role in the
utilization of IT and deriving benefits from its use.
4.0 The analysis
The detailed analysis of the model can be found in
Clemons and Reddi ([7]). Here we present an overview of
the analysis and a summary of our findings. The analysis
how this affects the relative attractiveneas of three modes
of organizing economic activity. The profit functions
To evaluate the profit functions and to examine the role
of the changing characteristics of IT, we make the
following assumptions:
(1) The discount rate d=0.
We simplify the profit functions (1)-(3) by making the
above assumptions and solve for the optimal IT
investment in each of the three modes of economic
organization. We then substitute these optimal values of
IT investments in the profit functions to derive the
optimal profit functions for the three modes of
The analysis examines the point at which the buyer is
initially indifferent between two modes of organization
and then examines the relative rates at which the optimal
mode for which the profit function increases at a faster rate
the other mode if IT's cost-effectiveness or relationship-
specificity were to change in those directions.
The results of the analyses can be summarized tersely
in the following three diagrams.
organization.Figure 1 illustrates initial conditions. With high
variance in prices (high price risk) and with low product
complexity and low uncertainty in demand (low
transaction risk) the preferred organizational design entails
use of the spot market; this enables the firm to shop for
the best price, and consistent with Williamson ([15]) with
price risk decreases the benefits from searching among
suppliers to locate the best price decrease, and thus long
term purchasing arrangements and partnership begin to
replace use of spot markets. But (again consistent with
in demand and high product complexity, vertical
integration is the preferred structure, and internal
production is preferred to procurement.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the impact of a decreasing
the degree of opportunism exhibited by suppliers
Our results are explained and summarized below. At the
margin, or boundary of the firm, where a firm would
previously have been indifferent between competing
organizations of production or procurement, the following
changes are driven or enabled by changes in information
technology:
Under conditions of high product complexity or high
integration had been favored, the marginal impact of
is to decrease vertical integration. This is true regardless of
the degree of opportunism actually exhibited by suppliers
of the “move to the market” predicted by Malone,
Benjamin, and Yates ([13]) and the “move to the middle”
predicted by Clemons, Reddi and Row ([8]).
where use of the market would
increasing the cost/performance
have been preferred,decreases the importance of the market and increases
reliance upon partnerships. This runs directly counter to
predictions of a move to the market, while supporting the
move to the middle and the increased importance of stable
partnerships predicted by Bakos and Brynjolfsson ([2]).
However, this is true under conditions where a high degree
of opportunism is actually exhibited by suppliers; under
indeterminate.
Under conditions of high product complexity or high
integration had been favored, the marginal impact of
improving the idiosyncracity of IT investments is to
reduce the attractiveness of vertical integration increasing
the attractiveness both of the market and of partnerships.
Again, this is supportive of Malone et al. and Clemons et
al. This is true regardless of the degree of opportunism
actually exhibited by suppliers (that is, it is independent
where use of the market would have been preferred, when
is high) decreasing the idiosyncracity of IT investments
reduces the attractiveness of the market. This is due to the
greater marginal benefit to using partnership as compared
to using the the market. This supports the move to the middle
hypothesis.
However, under conditions where suppliers exhibit a
supports the move to the market hypothesis.
5.0 Conclusion
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this paper
is that it provides analysis that resolves the apparently
contradictory predictions of Malone et al. ([13]), who
proposed that IT’s impact is a “move to the market”, and
Clemons et al. ([8]), who suggested that IT would cause a
“move to the middle”. We find that depending on the
prices over time and among suppliers, the reducing
market” or a “move to the middle”. However, it is clear
that IT will facilitate a greater degree of outsourcing and
hence contribute to art evolution towards smaller
organizations focused around their core activities.
Empirical studies are critical in conjunction with
theoretical models of phenomena as complex as the
changing nature of outsourcing, integration, and
partnership. These effects may or may not be occurring in
the ways we predict, at the rates we predict, or for the
reasons we develop in the model. Other trends may be
driving outsourcing, such as excess capacity due to the
current global recession, so that the trend is occurring
more rapidly than our model can explain. Alternatively,
factors that inhibit firms’ flexibility, like their existing
fixed investment in in-house production capability, may
result in trends towards outsourcing and partnerships
moving more slowly than the model would indicate. We
are therefore concurrently conducting empirical studies on
changes in the organization of economic activity and the
possible roles of IT in driving or facilitating these
changes.
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l.This originally seemed paradoxical to us, but we now
understand it as an artifact of the conditions assumed. It
seems improbable that a high degree of price variability
would be associated with no opportunism in the presence
of idiosyncratic investments. However, under these
partnerships, where opportunism is already low, and
instead makes investments in coordination more
appropriate even for one-off market mediated transactions.
We include this result merely for completeness, and to
demonstrate that when faced with unlikely combinations
of conditions our model nonetheless sucessfully produces
plausible and defensible results.